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COURT OF APPEALS OF NEW YORK
People v. Knox'
(decided February 17, 2009)
In a consolidated appeal, the New York Court of Appeals ad-
dressed the constitutionality of requiring individuals not convicted of
sexually related crimes to register as sex offenders.2 Each defendant
claimed his or her due process rights were violated under both the
United States Constitution3 and New York Constitution 4 "because the
crimes underlying their registration involve[d] no actual, intended or
threatened sexual misconduct."5 While the defendants did "not dis-
pute that they [had] committed crimes that warrant finding them a
danger to the public, and specifically to children," they argued that
being labeled as sex offenders was false and misleading.6
In People v. Knox, Judy Knox pleaded guilty to attempted
kidnapping after she "approached a group of children in a park,
grabbed the arm of an eight-year-old girl and tried to pull her away."'
She previously lost custody of her daughter and sought to replace her
with this child.8 There was no evidence that Knox sexually molested
the child, or attempted to kidnap her with that intent.9 Similarly, the
defendant in People v. Cintron was convicted of unlawful imprison-
ment of two children.10 In Cintron, Eliezer Cintron became upset
with his girlfriend and was "asked . .. to leave her apartment."' 1 In
' 903 N.E.2d 1149 (N.Y. 2009).
2 Id. at 1150.
3 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1, states, in pertinent part: "No State shall ... deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law. . . ."
4 N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 6, states, in pertinent part: "No person shall be deprived of life, li-
berty or property without due process of law."
5 Knox, 903 N.E.2d at 1151.




1o Knox, 903 N.E.2d at 1151.
" Id. at 1150.
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retaliation and without the intent to commit sexual assault, he locked
his girlfriend in her apartment with her two small children, ages one
and two.12 They remained falsely imprisoned against their will for
several days.' 3 Lastly, in People v. Jackson, Francis Jackson was an
organizer of a prostitution ring.14 When one of his employees threat-
ened to quit, he forcibly abducted her young son,'" and told her that
he would kill him "if she did not continue to work [as a prostitute] for
him."' 6 Pursuant to a plea agreement, Jackson pleaded guilty to at-
tempted kidnapping.'7 Similar to Knox and Cintron, Jackson's rea-
son for kidnapping the child was not sexually motivated, but rather
with the intent to force the child's mother to continue working for
him.'8
Despite the fact that each defendant committed non-sexual
crimes, all were required to register as sex offenders under the Sex
Offender Registration Act ("SORA").19 In each case, the Appellate
Division, First Department, affirmed the orders of the supreme
court.20  The defendants subsequently appealed to the New York
Court of Appeals and argued that having to register as sex offenders
violated their substantive due process rights.2 1 The New York Court
of Appeals affirmed the appellate division's judgment and upheld the
constitutionality of SORA. 22
In affirming all three convictions, the New York Court of Ap-
peals addressed whether being required to register as a sex offender
amounted to a violation of the defendants' substantive due process
rights.23 While the defendants may properly assert a constitutionally
protected liberty interest,24 the right asserted was not fundamental in
12 Id. at 1150-51.
13 id.
14 Id. at 1151.





20 Knox, 903 N.E.2d at 1151.
21 id
22 Id at 1155.
23 Id. at 1151.
24 A protected liberty interest can exist in the context of procedural due process. Damage
to reputation alone, however, does not invoke a protected liberty interest. Paul v. Davis, 424
U.S. 693, 712 (1976). Courts commonly apply a two-tiered "stigma plus infringement" test.
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the context of substantive due process. 25 In assessing whether the de-
fendants' due process rights were violated, the court noted that "[a]ll
infringements of liberty by the State must be tested under the [D]ue
[P]rocess [C]lause, but where no fundamental right is infringed legis-
lation is valid if it is rationally related to legitimate government inter-
ests."26 The court found "[t]he right not to have a misleading label
attached to one's serious crime is not fundamental," and therefore,
does not amount to a violation of due process. 27 Finding no funda-
mental right, the court applied rational basis scrutiny and found a le-
gitimate state interest in requiring those convicted of kidnapping and
unlawful imprisonment of children to register as sex offenders. 28 The
court held that
the Legislature had a rational basis for concluding
that, in the large majority of cases where people kid-
nap or unlawfully imprison other people's children,
the children either are sexually assaulted or are in
danger of sexual assault. In light of this, it was plainly
rational for the Legislature to provide that, as a general
rule, people guilty of such crimes should be classified
as "sex offenders."29
Damage to reputation, or stigma, plus some other tangible detriment will often result in a
violation of a protected liberty interest. Valmonte v. Bane, 18 F.3d 992, 999 (2d Cir. 1994);
Neu v. Corcoran, 869 F.2d 662, 667 (2d Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 816 (1989); Con-
nelly v. Comptroller of the Currency, 876 F.2d 1209, 1215 (5th Cir. 1989). Moreover, the
United States Supreme Court in Vitek v. Jones found a violation of procedural due process
where an individual is stigmatized as mentally ill and involuntarily committed. 445 U.S.
480, 492 (1980). Under Nebraska law, prison officials were given the authority to identify
and transfer mentally ill inmates to an institution without first awarding them a judicial hear-
ing. Id. at 483. The Court clarified that the stigmatization of being mentally ill coupled with
the transfer to a mental institution violated each individual's liberty interest under the Due
Process Clause. Id. at 492. Furthermore, in Branch v. Collier, a federal district court applied
the stigma plus infringement analysis and found that an individual, who is convicted of ag-
gravated assault and not a sexually related offense, has a protected liberty interest in his or
her name and picture being labeled as a sex offender on a public website. No. Civ. A.
302CV0021-BF, 2004 WL 942194, at *1, *5 (N.D. Tex. Apr. 30, 2004); see also Chambers
v. Colorado Dep't of Corr., 205 F.3d 1237, 1240 (10th Cir. 2000); Kirby v. Siegelman, 195
F.3d 1285 (11th Cir. 1999); Neal v. Shimoda, 131 F.3d 818 (9th Cir. 1997).
25 Knox, 903 N.E.2d at 1152.
26 Id (citing Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 728 (1997)).
27 Id. at 1153.
28 Id.
29 Id. at 1154.
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Therefore, requiring defendants to register as sex offenders did not
amount to a violation of substantive due process.30
In applying rational basis, the court noted that "the Legisla-
ture could rationally have relied on the fact that a great many cases of
kidnapping or unlawful imprisonment of children are indeed sex of-
fenses." 3 1 Relying primarily on statistics, the court noted that "in
[forty-six percent] of the nonfamily abductions studied, the perpetra-
tor had sexually assaulted the child." 32 Thus, even though there was
no discernible risk of sexual assault or molestation in these three cas-
es, the court determined that the Legislature could rationally have
concluded that in the majority of cases, kidnapping and unlawful im-
prisonment of children are often motivated by sexual intentions.
The court in Knox relied on the reasoning applied in People v.
Taylor.34 In Taylor, the defendant was convicted of kidnapping in the
first degree.3 ' Even though the defendant did not commit any sexual
misconduct, he was required to register as a sex offender pursuant to
SORA.36 The issue on appeal was whether the requirements of
SORA applied to Taylor since he was only convicted of kidnapping
in the first degree.37 The county court, relying primarily on the fact
that Taylor's crime was not sexual in nature, found that the imposi-
tion of SORA "violated his constitutional right to due process of
law." 3 8 The government appealed this decision, and in opposition
Taylor argued that "in light of the facts of his particular crime, it was
irrational to label him a sex offender and subject him to the require-
ments of SORA."39
The appellate division, however, upheld the constitutionality
SORA. 40 The court applied a two-tiered analysis:
Where the deprivation of a fundamental right is at is-
sue, the governmental action in question is subject to
30 Knox, 903 N.E.2d at 1153.
32 Id. (internal citation omitted).
1 Id. at 1154.
34 835 N.Y.S.2d 241 (App. Div. 2d. Dep't 2007).
3 Id. at 242 (internal citation omitted).
36 Id. at 243.
3 Id.
38 id
3 Taylor, 835 N.Y.S.2d at 244.
4 Id. at 245.
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strict scrutiny, and will pass constitutional muster only
if it is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state in-
terest. Where no fundamental right is implicated, the
requirements of due process are satisfied if there is a
rational basis for the governmental action.4 1
Concluding that the right asserted by Taylor was not fundamental-
as commonly understood in the due process context-the court ap-
plied rational basis scrutiny and upheld SORA.42 The court began its
analysis by noting "that acts of the Legislature are presumed to be
constitutional and, therefore, the defendant bears a heavy burden" in
convincing the court that the Legislature lacked a rational basis to
enact the legislation. 4 3 The court found that the Legislature had a ra-
tional basis for including kidnappers within the ambit of SORA.44
While kidnapping and unlawful imprisonment of children are often
not thought to be motivated by sexual desires, the court reasoned that
these crimes often precede sexual offenses.45 In other words, "the
Legislature could reasonably have concluded that kidnappers should
be required to register as well, if only because the absence of a sexual
element from the kidnapping may be the merely fortuitous result of
the interruption of the offender's plan." 46
Other decisions indicate New York's commitment to requir-
ing those convicted of kidnapping and unlawful imprisonment of
children to register as sex offenders under SORA.47 For example, in
People v. Cassano, the defendant was convicted of attempted kid-
napping in the second degree. 4 8 Although there was no sexual com-
ponent with respect to the kidnapping, his conviction classified him
as a level two sex offender.49 On appeal, Cassano argued that SORA
was "unconstitutional as applied to him, because there is no evidence
that his crime had a sexual aspect or motive, so that requiring him to
41 Id. at 243 (internal citations omitted).
42 id
43 Id. at 244.
4 Taylor, 835 N.Y.S.2d at 245.
45 id.
46 id.
47 See People v. Lisle-Cannon, 820 N.Y.S.2d 280, 280 (App. Div. 2d Dep't 2006); People
v. Cassano, 823 N.Y.S.2d 395, 396 (App. Div. 1st Dep't 2006);
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register as a sex offender does not serve the interests underlying
SORA."50 Even without a sexual component to the kidnapping, the
court held that "attempted kidnapping of a child .. . [does] not negate
a possible sexual motive."5' Likewise, in People v. Lisle-Cannon, the
Appellate Division, Second Department, upheld the lower court's de-
termination that the defendant must register as a sex offender even
though he pleaded guilty only to attempted kidnapping in the second
degree. 52 The court indicated that "[a]lthough the defendant's crimi-
nal conduct was financially motivated and was entirely devoid of any
sexual component, he was, by operation of. . . [SORA] certified as a
sex offender.",5 In each of the aforementioned cases, the court found
a legitimate state interest in requiring convicted kidnappers to register
as sex offenders.
While it seems clear that New York finds no constitutional
violation in requiring those convicted of kidnapping and unlawful
imprisonment to register as sex offenders, at least one New York trial
court has held otherwise.54 In People v. Bell, the defendant, along
with others, unsuccessfully "attempted to rob a man outside of the
man's apartment."55 The victim of the robbery escaped and returned
to his apartment, "but in doing so he left his three[-]year[-]old daugh-
ter and his friend behind in the hallway." 56 Bell and his accomplices
"took the child and then concocted a scheme to blackmail the victim
and his wife."57 Their scheme failed and the child was returned un-
harmed. 8 Bell was convicted of kidnapping in the first degree.59
When Bell was released on parole in 2001, he was immediately
deemed a sex offender under SORA. 60 Similar to the arguments pre-
sented in the prior cases, Bell claimed that his substantive due
process rights were violated in being labeled as a sex offender be-
5o Id at 395-96.
1Id. at 396.
52 Lisle-Cannon, 820 N.Y.S.2d at 280.
5 Id.
54 People v. Bell, 778 N.Y.S.2d 837 (Bronx County Ct. 2003).
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cause he was only convicted of kidnapping in the first degree.6 1
Finding the existence of a fundamental right, the court applied strict
scrutiny to determine if the Legislature had a compelling state interest
in subjecting kidnappers to the requirements of SORA. In applying
strict scrutiny, the court held that requiring Bell to "register as a 'sex
offender' is completely arbitrary and unreasonable [and has] no sub-
stantial relation to the public morals or general sexually-charged safe-
ty issues which ... [SORA] was enacted to safeguard against." 63 The
court enunciated that "[n]one of Mr. Bell's actions in kidnapping the
three[-]year old child were done for the purpose of sexual victimiza-
tion of the child, and there is no assertion that during the period in
which she was held ransom the child was in any way molested or
sexually abused." 64 While the decision in Bell is not aligned with the
majority of New York cases, its reasoning provides some insight into
how future courts should address the issue.
In our society, being labeled as a sex offender is not only harmful
to one's reputation, but results in becoming a social outcast. Once
labeled as a sex offender, life with respect to schooling, employment,
housing, and many other areas becomes exceedingly difficult. In
E.B. v. Verniero, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals noted that hav-
ing to register as a sex offender results in "profound humiliation and
isolation," and loss of employment as well as housing opportunities.65
Moreover, the court noted that often "[flamily and other personal re-
lationships [are] destroyed or severely strained" as a result of having
to register as a sex offender. 66 Perhaps the New York Court of Ap-
peals should have taken a closer look at the harmful effects of having
to register as a sex offender under SORA. By failing to analyze the
issue in this light, many individuals will be forced to endure lives of
social isolation and despair without having committed a sexually re-
lated crime.
For those who have committed a sexual offense against a
child, the resulting stigmatization as a sex offender is just. Essential-
ly, if one has been convicted of a sex offense, the cost-benefit analy-
61 Id. at 842.
62 id
6' Bell, 778 N.Y.S.2d at 847.
6 id.
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sis comes out in favor of society and the need to protect children
from sexual predators. Society must therefore be on notice for the
obvious reason that sex offenders threaten the health and safety of
children. Moreover, many fear living among or associating with sex-
ual predators. However, when the individual is not convicted of a
sexually related offense, the cost-benefit analysis must favor the indi-
vidual. In other words, the scale must be tipped in favor of individual
liberties, or more specifically, not being mislabeled as a sex offender.
As discussed, after finding that the right asserted is not fun-
damental, New York courts consistently apply rational basis review.
While there is a legitimate state interest in protecting children from
sexual predators, the means employed are overly inclusive. The
state's interest in protecting children is not furthered by labeling kid-
nappers and those who falsely imprison children as sex offenders un-
der SORA. Even under a highly deferential rational basis scrutiny,
the connection between sexual offenses and kidnapping or false im-
prisonment is simply too attenuated to support finding a legitimate
state interest. While an over inclusive law will often survive an ap-
plication of rational basis,67 SORA is simply too broad to withstand
such scrutiny.
The court in Bell mentioned State v. Washington, an Ohio
case that found that the link between the need to protect children
from sexual predators and labeling those convicted of kidnapping or
false imprisonment of children as sex offenders was weak. 68 In its
decision, the court stated that "[w]hile the General Assembly had a
legitimate reason to enact the sexual predator statute, we fail to see
how the purpose of the statute is furthered when there is absolutely
no evidence that the offense committed was sexual in nature." 69 In
Washington, the defendant kidnapped "his infant daughter during a
domestic dispute."70 The court noted that it is not clear "how the ad-
judication of [the] defendant [in this case] . . . protects the public
from sex[] offenders."7  Applying rational basis scrutiny, the court
held that "there is no rational relationship between this legitimate go-
vernmental interest and the imposition of the sexually oriented of-
67 See N.Y. City Transit Auth. v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568, 592 (1979).
6 No. 99-L-015, 2001 WL 1415568, at *1,*3 (Ohio Ct. App. Nov. 14, 2001).
69 Id.
70 Id.
71 Id. (footnote omitted).
976 [Vol. 26
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fense label upon" the defendant. 72 The reasoning applied in Wash-
ington is worthy of being transplanted into New York case law with
respect to this issue. While there is well established precedent that
being mislabeled as sex offender does not implicate a fundamental
right, perhaps it is time for this long standing rule to be reevaluated.
Furthermore, while the New York Court of Appeals argues
that the intent of those who kidnap or falsely imprison children is of-
ten sexually motivated, it is necessary to take a more nuanced ap-
proach. In some cases, individuals will kidnap children with the in-
tent to sexually abuse or molest them. However, this is not always
the case. For example, in Knox, the defendant kidnapped a young
girl because she was mentally ill and wanted a child of her own.n
Moreover, in Cintron, the defendant falsely imprisoned his girlfriend
and her young child because he was angry and sought revenge.74
Lastly, in Jackson, the motivation for taking the child was to ensure
that the young boy's mother continued to work for him as a prosti-
tute.75 While all three defendants present a danger to society and
should be fully prosecuted, they are not sex offenders. The legisla-
tive intent in enacting SORA is well founded, but its application is
widely over inclusive. SORA should include kidnappers and those
who falsely imprison children only if there is sufficient evidence that
the crime committed was sexually motivated. Arguably, moving
away from a bright line rule to a more case by case analysis will in-
crease litigation and require courts to determine the motivation of
each defendant. While this may consume additional time and re-




" Knox, 903 N.E.2d at 1150.
74 Id. at 1150-51.
71 Id. at 1151.
2010] 977
9
Pinnola: Court of Appeals of New York - People v. Knox
Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2010
10
Touro Law Review, Vol. 26 [2010], No. 3, Art. 22
https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol26/iss3/22
